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FISHING FOR THE BIG BOYS: 
COMPETING INTERESTS UNDER THE 
FISHERIES ACT 1996 
Jordan Boyd* 
This article examines the effect of two recent and connected developments on fisheries management 
in New Zealand. The first development is a change to s 13 of the Fisheries Act 1996, that Act’s 
central operative sustainability provision. The second development is the Supreme Court’s decision 
in the Kahawai case. This article argues that these two developments mean that the operation and 
interpretation of the Fisheries Act favour commercial interests over recreational ones. It argues that 
the minority’s interpretation in the Kahawai case was correct and that, therefore, the change to s 13 
was unnecessary. This article concludes that the structural bias in the Fisheries Act is undesirable, 
as catch allowance decisions are (and should be) essentially political.  
I INTRODUCTION 
A number of fish species valued by both commercial and recreational fishers are regulated under 
the Fisheries Act 1996 (the Act) using the quota management system. The inherent tension this 
creates is exacerbated by competing aspirations as to how a fishery should operate. Commercial 
fishers believe fisheries should provide maximum sustainable yields. This involves removing a large 
portion of a species' biomass allowing the remaining fish to grow more quickly, enabling greater 
yield. Recreational fishers want larger fish that are easier to catch, meaning they want a higher 
biomass. This biomass conflict is part of a broader policy fight contemplated by s 8 of the Act, 
which states: "The purpose of this Act is to provide for the utilisation of fisheries resources while 
ensuring sustainability." This article will analyse the effect on the balance between recreational and 
commercial fisheries in light of two recent, connected developments. The first is the change to s 13, 
the central operative sustainability mechanism in the Act, prompted by a 2008 High Court decision.1 
This change enables the Minister of Fisheries (the Minister) to set a quota even where he or she does 
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1  Antons Trawling Co Ltd v The Minister of Fisheries HC Wellington CIV 2007-485-2199, 22 February 2008. 
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not have information regarding the health of a fish stock. The second development is New Zealand 
Recreational Fishing Council Inc v Sanford Ltd (the Kahawai case), handed down by the Supreme 
Court in 2009.2 This is an important topic, and the intersection of property rights, environmental 
concerns and the rights of those who wish to fish makes it a vexed issue. Consequently, the law has 
been sculpted by frequent litigation as each side tries to tip the balance in its favour.  
Broadly, this article argues that the change to s 13 and the Kahawai case have the effect of 
favouring commercial interests. It argues that the decision of the Supreme Court is more than the 
narrow judicial review case it appears to be; rather it reflects competing philosophies for the 
operation of the quota management system. The Court was split as to how the Minister should set 
the total allowable commercial catch. This article argues that the dissenting judgment fits better with 
the context of the Act and gives the Minister more latitude to give effect to competing aspirations. 
This article will also analyse how the change to s 13 is linked to the judgments in the Kahawai case, 
demonstrating that, had the minority's interpretation been taken, the change to s 13 would be 
unnecessary. The effect of the change is also considered, and it is further argued that it is 
undesirable to reduce the informational requirement of the Act in the way the section contemplates. 
The article concludes that a fisheries regime structurally favouring any interest is undesirable, and 
that it should be up to the Minister to make what is essentially a political decision.  
To make these arguments, this article will do four things. First, it will summarise the operation 
of the quota management system. Second, it will outline the change to s 13. Third, it will analyse the 
Kahawai case, demonstrating that the minority judgment better fits with the wording and policy of 
the Act. This also involves analysis as to how the change to s 13 alters the mechanics of the Act. 
Fourth, it will demonstrate how the changes to the Act have implications for both interested parties 
and the future of the Act itself. 
II MANAGEMENT OF FISHERIES IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Inception of the Quota Management System 
Before the 1960s, the New Zealand fishing industry was relatively small and underdeveloped. 
From the mid 1960s, foreign vessels began fishing in New Zealand waters, and between 1970 and 
1977, yield from New Zealand fisheries increased from 50,000 tons to 500,000 tons.3 This dramatic 
increase led to concerns that fishing was becoming unsustainable. The creation of exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs) in international law provided New Zealand with the opportunity and 
  
2  New Zealand Recreational Fishing Council Inc & Ors v Sanford Ltd [2009] NZSC 54, [2009] 3 NZLR 438 
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responsibility to ensure that marine resources were sustainably managed.4 The EEZ meant that New 
Zealand had exclusive control of the area within 200 nautical miles of the coast, a total area more 
than 15 times the size of New Zealand's land mass.5 
Prior to 1986, this massive marine resource was regulated by input controls. Input controls are 
designed to limit the amount of pressure exerted on a fishery through a regulatory regime including 
licenses, minimum fish sizes, fishing seasons and vessel controls.6 The Fisheries Act 1983 marks 
the high water mark of input controls in New Zealand. However, the 1983 Act failed to deal 
adequately with the problems of overfishing and overcapitalisation of the industry (too many boats 
chasing too few fish), leading to eventual consensus that a new approach was required.7 In 1986, the 
quota management system was implemented. This approach added a layer of output controls to the 
existing regime. These controls focus directly on controlling harvest levels by restricting the amount 
of fish taken.8  
B Principles and Operation of the Fisheries Act 
1 Part 2: purpose and principles  
In order for the marine environment to generate the maximum benefit for New Zealand, the 
quota management system must ensure it is used in a way that both protects fish stocks for future 
generations and enables use by the current generation. Section 8 of the Act strikes the balance in the 
following way:9 
(1) The purpose of this Act is to provide for the utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring 
sustainability.  
(2) In this Act—  
Ensuring sustainability means—  
  
4  The exclusive economic zone was set up under the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, and Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act 1977, which was passed when it became clear that the concept would be recognised 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (opened for signature 10 December 1982, 
entered into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS]. 
5  Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977. 
6  Brookers Introduction to Brookers Fisheries (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [Intro.03(4)]; Quin, above n 
3, at 518. 
7  Quin, above n 3, at 519. 
8  Kelly Lock and Stefan Leslie New Zealand's Quota Management System: A History of the First Twenty 
Years (Motu Economic and Public Policy Research, 2007) at 3; Brookers, above n 6, at [Intro.03(4)]. 
9  Fisheries Act 1996, s 8. 
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(a) maintaining the potential of fisheries resources to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of 
future generations; and  
(b) avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of fishing on the aquatic 
environment:  
utilisation means conserving, using, enhancing, and developing fisheries resources to enable people to 
provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being.   
In the Kahawai case, the Supreme Court held that the competing social policies of sustainability 
and utilisation express a single statutory purpose.10 The Court recognised that because it is unlikely 
decision makers will be able to accommodate both policies in full, "[the weight] given to utilisation 
must not be such as to jeopardise sustainability. Fisheries are to be utilised, but sustainability is to be 
ensured".11  
Section 9 of the Act lists environmental factors decision makers are to take into account: 
(a) associated or dependent species should be maintained above a level that ensures their long-term 
viability; 
(b) biological diversity of the aquatic environment should be maintained; 
(c) Habitat of particular significance for fisheries management should be protected.  
These principles are drawn from the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity.12 They reflect an 
acknowledged "change in course" for the Ministry of Fisheries (the Ministry).13 Instead of resource 
management, the principles supposedly recognise the resource in an environmental context, 
enabling ecosystem-based management.14  
An obvious challenge for the Minister is that decisions made under the Act must be made with 
imperfect information; information is both physically difficult and expensive to collect, and the 
resulting data is inherently uncertain. Section 10 addresses informational principles: 
(a) decisions should be based on the best available information; 
(b) decision makers should consider any uncertainty in the information available in any case; 
  
10  The Kahawai case, above n 2, at [39].  
11  Ibid.  
12  UNCLOS, above n 4, arts 61, 62 and 192; Convention on Biological Diversity (5 June 1992, entered into 
force 29 December 1993). 
13  Ministry of Fisheries Changing Course – Towards Fisheries 2010 (1996) at 6-9. 
14  Ibid. 
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(c) decision makers should be cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable, or inadequate; 
(d) the absence of, or any uncertainty in, any information should not be used as a reason for postponing 
or failing to take any measure to achieve the purpose of this Act.  
Section 10 was designed to incorporate the precautionary principle, enabling prevention of 
serious environmental damage even where there is not full scientific certainty.15 Incorporation of 
the precautionary approach was an explicit motivation of the Minister when the Fisheries Bill was 
introduced:16 
To help decision makers achieve the purpose of this Bill, guidance is provided through the statement of 
high-level principles ... the clause provides information principles. This allows the adoption of 
precautionary approaches. 
While the high level principles in ss 8, 9 and 10 focus on the fishery resource itself, other 
principles can be elicited regarding the operation of the fishing industry. In order for a quota 
management system to be viable, it must create appropriate economic incentives. This works in two 
ways. First, incentives should act to make fishing a desirable economic activity, enabling the 
creation and continuation of a fishing industry. Second, it should be in the interests of the fishers to 
be within the quota management system, meaning severe penalties must be applied to those outside 
the system. 
2 Parts 3 and 4: sustainability measures and the quota management system  
The effect of ss 8, 9 and 10 can be seen in the operation of the quota management system. The 
system works by first dividing New Zealand's territorial sea into a number of quota management 
areas.17 Fish species regulated by the quota management system are subdivided into stocks that are 
defined by their quota management areas. For example, the snapper stock in quota management area 
one is known as SNA1. By managing each stock individually, the quota management system 
recognises that managing stocks at a national level is not always feasible or desirable. Instead, quota 
management areas are determined according to a biological understanding of the distribution of a 
species, meaning that some species will only have one quota management area, while others will 
have more.18 By managing smaller areas, the quota management system enables a greater degree of 
control over a particular stock. 
Within each stock, the Minister sets a total allowable catch (TAC) under s 13 that enables the 
stock to produce maximum sustainable yield (MSY). MSY is defined in s 2: 
  
15  Rio Declaration on Environment and Development UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol I) (1992) Principle 15. 
16  (6 December 1994) 545 NZPD 5390. 
17  Fisheries Act 1996, s 24. 
18  Lock and Leslie, above n 8, at 3. 
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Maximum sustainable yield, in relation to any stock, means the greatest yield that can be achieved 
over time while maintaining the stock's productive capacity, having regard to the population dynamics 
of the stock and any environmental factors that influence the stock. 
The basic science underpinning the MSY concept is important to understand. Where a fishery 
exists in an un-fished state, its biomass will be 100 per cent, a level known as the carrying capacity 
of an environment. The yield of that fishery will be zero. Put simply, at a biomass of less than 100 
per cent, a fishery will grow back towards its carrying capacity. At a lower biomass, a fishery will 
grow more quickly, as the fish are generally younger, have less competition, and grow more rapidly. 
This harvestable growth is the yield.19 In the Kahawai case, the commercial fishers filed an affidavit 
of a fishery scientist who indicated that, while it differs from stock to stock, the biomass that can 
produce MSY is generally around 25 per cent. For kahawai, it is thought to be about 17 per cent.20 
Section 13 is the "key operative provision"21 through which sustainability is ensured. Section 13 
is a sustainability measure in the Act; through it the Minister can give effect to the high-level 
principles in ss 8, 9 and 10. Section 13(1) provides that, once set, the TAC stays in force until 
varied. Sections 13(2) and (3) are the key provisions: 
(2) The Minister shall set a total allowable catch that—  
(a) maintains the stock at or above a level that can produce the maximum sustainable yield, 
having regard to the interdependence of stocks; or  
(b) enables the level of any stock whose current level is below that which can produce the 
maximum sustainable yield to be altered—  
(i) in a way and at a rate that will result in the stock being restored to or above a level 
that can produce the maximum sustainable yield, having regard to the 
interdependence of stocks; and  
(ii) within a period appropriate to the stock, having regard to the biological 
characteristics of the stock and any environmental conditions affecting the stock; 
or  
(c) enables the level of any stock whose current level is above that which can produce the 
maximum sustainable yield to be altered in a way and at a rate that will result in the stock 
moving towards or above a level that can produce the maximum sustainable yield, having 
regard to the interdependence of stocks.  
  
19  New Zealand Recreational Fishing Council Inc & Ors v Sanford Ltd [2009] NZSC 54 pleadings transcript 
(the Kahawai case pleadings transcript) at 64 per Mr Scott. 
20  Ibid, at 65 per Mr Scott. 
21  The Kahawai case, above n 2, at [41]. 
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 ...  
(3) In considering the way in which and rate at which a stock is moved towards or above a level that 
can produce maximum sustainable yield under subsection (2)(b) or (c), or (2A) (if applicable), the 
Minister shall have regard to such social, cultural, and economic factors as he or she considers 
relevant.  
Beyond restricting the TAC under s 13, the Minister can impose a number of other sustainability 
measures by regulation. These can include the creation of a fisheries plan,22 limiting catch based on 
the size, sex or biological state of any stock,23 restricting the areas from which fish may be taken,24 
restricting fishing methods,25 or imposing a fishing season.26  
Out of the TAC comes the total allowable commercial catch (TACC). The TACC is part of the 
quota management system in Part 4 of the Act. As with s 13(1), s 20(1) provides that, once set, the 
TACC stays in force until varied. The setting and variation of the TACC is also governed by s 20:27  
(2) The Minister may from time to time, by notice in the Gazette, vary any total allowable commercial 
catch set for any quota management stock by increasing or reducing that total allowable commercial 
catch.  
(3) Without limiting the generality of subsections (1) and (2) of this section, the Minister may set or 
vary a total allowable commercial catch at, or to, zero.  
... 
(5) A total allowable commercial catch for any quota management stock shall not—  
(a) be set unless the total allowable catch for that stock has been set under section 13 or 
section 14; or  
(b) be greater than the total allowable catch set for that stock.  
Section 21(1) provides that, when setting the TACC, the Minister must have regard to the TAC and 
allow for:  
(a) The following non-commercial fishing interests in that stock, namely–  
  
22  Fisheries Act 1996, s 11A. 
23  Ibid, s 11(3)(b). 
24  Ibid, s 11(3)(c). 
25  Ibid, s 11(3)(d). 
26  Ibid, s 11(3)(e). 
27  Ibid, s 20. 
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 (i) maori customary non-commercial fishing interests; and  
 (ii) recreational interests; and  
(b) All other mortality to that stock caused by fishing.  
Sections 21(2) and 21(3) require the Minister to consult with stakeholders and provide reasons 
for his or her decision. In making a decision, the Minister has to take into account matai reserves 
under s 21(4) and any regulations that restrict fishing under s 21(5). 
Once determined, the TACC is split between commercial fishers who hold quota for that fish 
stock. The quotas held by commercial fishers are known as "individual transferrable quotas". An 
individual transferable quota generates a holder's annual catch entitlement, which gives the fisher a 
right to catch the specified percentage of the annual TACC for a particular fishery. This property 
right means that fishers are stakeholders, which theoretically facilitates the purposes of the Act in 
two ways. First, it creates an incentive for fishers to adopt sustainable fishing practices, as to do 
otherwise is harmful to their stake holding. This should also result in greater industry responsibility, 
reducing the need for government intervention. Second, it means that fishers do not race against 
each other to catch a limited amount in the shortest time possible; instead, their catch can be over 
the full year. The effect of this is to ease the "race to fish", meaning fewer resources are required to 
catch the same number of fish over a year, subsequently reducing overcapitalisation and putting the 
focus on quality of fish rather than quantity.28 
While this structure of fisheries management is fairly well entrenched in New Zealand, its future 
success depends on how it manages to balance competing interests. This challenge is increasingly 
urgent. The quota management system is expanding, with ever more species falling under its ambit. 
Even more significantly, the number of people wishing to use the marine environment is increasing. 
Their interests include not just fishing, but aquaculture, tourism, mineral extraction and 
environmentalism. The next two parts of this article will analyse the two recent developments 
mentioned to demonstrate how, structurally, they push the balance in favour of commercial fishing 
interests. 
III THE CHANGE TO SECTION 13 
In 2008, the High Court, in Antons Trawling Co Ltd v The Minister of Fisheries (Antons 
Trawling) reviewed a decision of the Minister to reduce substantially the TAC for orange roughy in 
ORH1.29 In setting the TAC under s 13(2)(b), the Minister was motivated by a perceived need to 
rebuild the stock to a level at or above that which could produce MSY.30 However, the decision was 
  
28  Quin, above n 3, at 520. 
29  Antons Trawling Co Ltd v The Minister of Fisheries, above n 1. 
30  Ibid, at [35]. 
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made with no knowledge of the biomass, nor of the way and rate at which the stock should be 
rebuilt. Instead, the Minister opted for a precautionary approach based on the uncertainty about the 
biomass required to produce MSY.31 
Miller J held that s 10 applies to TAC setting under s 13, meaning information is required when 
setting the TAC:32 
… s 10 does not allow the Minister to set TAC under s 13(2)(b) without assessing stock levels at all. 
Only when such an assessment has been made can he determine whether s 13(2)(b) is available to him 
on the facts. 
In the case, a topographical survey had been available. However, officials discounted it, 
believing it would not produce "'conclusive' information".33 This was an error of law. Miller J 
provided guidance, stating that:34 
A TAC-setting decision should begin by identifying the best available information, being information 
that is available without unreasonable cost, effort, or time, and decisions may be based on such 
information although it is incomplete or inadequate or unreliable. 
Section 14(1) enables the Minister to set a TAC other than by s 13 where he or she thinks the 
purpose of the Act would be better served by doing so. This is tempered by s 14(8), which sets out 
the grounds on which the Minister may rely on s 14:   
(8) The Governor-General may from time to time, by Order in Council,—  
 (a) Omit the name of any stock from Schedule 3; 
 (b) Add to that Schedule the name of any stock if—  
(i) it is not possible, because of the biological characteristics of the species, to 
estimate maximum sustainable yield; or  
(ii) a national allocation for New Zealand has been determined as part of an 
international agreement; or  
(iii) the stock is managed on a rotational or enhanced basis; or  
(iv) the stock comprises 1 or more highly migratory species. 
  
31  Ibid, at [36]. 
32  Ibid, at [50]. 
33  Ibid, at [61]. 
34  Ibid.  
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Miller J held that this provision could not apply to the Minister's decision in Antons Trawling for 
two reasons. First, although not deciding the matter, Miller J indicated that invocation of s 14 would 
encounter resistance as the difficulty in estimating MSY for orange roughy may not be attributable 
to their "biological characteristics" as required by 14(8)(b)(i).35 Second, s 14(8)(b)(i) requires the 
high standard of impossibility before it can be relied upon.36 In this case, it was possible to 
determine MSY, meaning the provision could not apply.  
The decision in Antons Trawling meant that the Minister would need to ascertain the current 
stock level as well as the level required to produce MSY before setting a TAC under s 13. The 
perversity of this outcome was recognised in the case:37 
... because an existing TAC continues until changed, any attempt under section 13 to reduce a TAC that 
has been set without benefit of a stock estimate may summon a challenge on the ground that there is no 
stock estimate. The lay observer might think that perverse, but it aptly summarises this case. 
The implications of this ruling were wide. For 50 per cent of stocks almost no information is 
available, meaning the Minister would be unable to set and adjust TACs for the majority of fish 
stocks.38  
A The Response: A Change to s 13 
The Government responded swiftly to undercut the effect of Antons Trawling. In July 2008, the 
Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Bill (No 2) 2008 (the Bill) was introduced before Parliament. By 
September of the same year the Bill passed its third reading.39 The new provision is 13(2A): 
(2A) For the purposes of setting a total allowable catch under this section, if the Minister considers 
that the current level of the stock or the level of the stock that can produce the maximum 
sustainable yield is not able to be estimated reliably using the best available information, the 
Minister must—  
(a) not use the absence of, or any uncertainty in, that information as a reason for postponing or 
failing to set a total allowable catch for the stock; and  
(b) have regard to the interdependence of stocks, the biological characteristics of the stock, 
and any environmental conditions affecting the stock; and  
  
35  Ibid, at [55]. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Ministry of Fisheries "Briefing Note: Process for Urgent Amendment of the Fisheries Act" 20 March 2008 
(obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the Ministry of Fisheries) at 1. 
39  (23 September 2008) 648 NZPD 17520. 
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(c) set a total allowable catch—  
(i) using the best available information; and  
(ii) that is not inconsistent with the objective of maintaining the stock at or above, or  
moving the stock towards or above, a level that can produce the maximum sustainable 
yield. 
The Hon Steve Chadwick, moving the Bill to be read for a second time, characterised the 
amendment as "allow[ing] the management of fishing to continue as it has in the past."40 Members 
of Parliament also stressed that the change would have no impact on the principles of s 10.41 
IV THE KAHAWAI CASE 
A Background  
The Kahawai case is the most important recent decision on the quota management system.42 
The case was a judicial review brought on appeal by the New Zealand Recreational Fishing Council 
and the New Zealand Big Game Fishing Council (the recreational fishers) of the Minister's decision 
when setting the TACC for kahawai in KAH1 in 2004 and 2005. While the decisions of the Minister 
in setting the TACC had been overtaken by the passage of time, the statutory interpretation involved 
continues to have relevance as it provides guidance to ministerial decision-making under the Act.  
Kahawai is a species of fish that has been subject to the quota management system since 1 
October 2004. It is valued highly by recreational fishers, but is also of importance to commercial 
fishers.43 Because the resource is limited, the Minister had to decide how best to allocate it. While it 
was the Minister's decision in question, the first respondents in the Supreme Court were the fishing 
companies Sealord, Sanford and Pelagic & Tuna New Zealand (the commercial fishers). The 
Minister and the Chief Executive of the Ministry were second and third respondents.  
Both sides accepted that s 20 enables the Minister to determine which part of the TAC will be 
allocated to commercial fishers and which part to recreational fishers.44 The recreational fishers 
argued that the Minister's decision when setting the TACC must "enable people to provide for their 
social, economic, and cultural well-being" as required by s 8. In setting the TAC and TACC in both 
2004 and 2005, the Minister relied on the recent catch history of commercial and recreational 
  
40  Hon Steve Chadwick MP (Labour) (23 September 2008) 650 NZPD 19010.  
41  For example, The Hon Phil Heatley MP (National) said: "To clarify, the Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment 
Bill (No 2) is concerned with section 13 of the Fisheries Act. It is not concerned at all with section 10, and it  
does not address any issues relating to that section." (29 July 2008) 648 NZPD 17520. 
42  The Kahawai case, above n 2. 
43  The Kahawai case, above n 2, at [33]. 
44  Ibid, at [2] per Elias CJ dissenting.  
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fishers, subject to reductions to ensure sustainability.45 The recreational fishers argued that this 
quantitative measure failed to give effect to the qualitative requirements of s 8.46 In their view, had 
the Minister correctly applied the Act, he would have recognised and given effect to the priority of 
recreational fishers.47 The commercial fishers argued that no such priority exists and that the s 8 
principles relied on by the recreational fishers have no application in setting the TACC under s 20.48 
Underlying the dispute was a philosophical disagreement reflecting the parties' competing 
aspirations as to how a fishery should be run. Recreational fishers have an interest in a TAC set 
below the level required to produce MSY. A smaller TAC means more fish are left in the sea, 
making fish easier to catch and increasing the likelihood of larger fish. Similarly, a smaller TACC 
means that there is more for recreational fishers, even if they do not catch their full entitlement. 
Commercial fishers have an interest in realising MSY. This means they can catch more fish, giving 
them a greater return on their investment and a higher value for their quota property.49 
B Majority 
The majority rejected the recreational fishers' submission that the qualitative factors identified in 
s 8 governed the Minister's decision under ss 20 and 21.50 In their view, the sections had different 
aims: "Section 8 expresses a composite policy that is concerned with providing for utilisation 
subject to ensuring sustainability."51 This is relevant in s 13, which provides an obligation to move 
to a biomass at or above the level that will produce MSY.52 However, s 13 gives the Minister some 
flexibility to consider the aspirations of various interests for utilisation of the resource:53 
In considering the way in which and rate at which a stock is moved towards or above a level producing a 
maximum sustainable yield, the Minister must have regard to "social, cultural and economic factors as 
he or she considers relevant". This imports into the process for setting the total allowable catch a key 
aspect of the definition of "utilisation" in s 8(2). 
  
45  Ibid, at [50]. 
46  Ibid, at [3] per Elias CJ dissenting.  
47  Ibid. 
48  Ibid, at [2] per Elias CJ dissenting.  
49  Ibid, at [3] per Elias CJ dissenting.  
50  Ibid, at [60]. 
51  Ibid. 
52  Ibid, at [43]. 
53  Ibid, at [44] quoting the Fisheries Act 1996, s 13(3). 
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Because the policy of sustainable utilisation in s 8 is given effect when setting the TAC, that 
policy was found to be "not of direct relevance to decisions [made] under ss 20 and 21".54 Instead, 
setting the TACC involves a policy choice. The Minister must allocate a fixed resource between 
competing interests.55 However, s 21 provides that the Minister "shall allow for ... recreational 
interests".56 The Act does not define recreational interests.  The majority looked to statutory context 
for meaning. They noted that s 21 makes it clear "that recreational interests are non-commercial 
fishing interests which are not Māori customary non-commercial fishing interests", while s 8 
indicates that recreational interests are interests in the utilisation of fisheries resources.57  
The majority found that common usage of "allow for" means there must be some allowance:58 
On their ordinary meaning the words "allow for" require the Minister both to take into account those 
interests and to make provision for them in the calculation of the total allowable commercial catch. That 
makes plain that there is to be an allocation for recreational interests. 
Despite the requirement for an allowance, instruments such as bag limits and minimum size 
requirements mean the Minister can control how much recreational fishers catch.59 "The allowance 
accordingly represents what the Minister considers recreational interests should be able to catch but 
also all that they will be able to catch."60  
So as a matter of procedure, the Minister must first set the TAC under s 13 and then set the 
TACC under ss 20 and 21.61 The TACC cannot exceed the TAC.62 As sustainability has been 
ensured when setting the TAC, the Minister is generally expected to allocate the whole TAC to the 
various interests referred to in s 21.63 The majority expressed the Minister's obligations in the 
following terms:64 
  
54  Ibid, at [60]. 
55  Ibid, at [61]. 
56  Fisheries Act 1996, s 21(1)(a)(ii). 
57  The Kahawai case, above n 2, at [54]. 
58  Ibid, at [55]. 
59  Ibid, at [55]-[56]. 
60  Ibid, at [56]. 
61  Ibid, at [52]. 
62  Ibid; Fisheries Act 1996, s 20(5)(b). 
63  The Kahawai case, above n 2, at [52]. 
64  Ibid, at [53]. 
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... the total allowable commercial catch is ultimately determined by a calculation. Starting with the 
figure for the total allowable catch, the Minister must decide what allowances to make for what will be 
taken by the specified non-commercial fishing interests, and all other mortality caused by fishing. The 
Minister deducts the sum of these allowances from the total allowable catch and the difference is the 
total allowable commercial catch.  
Moreover, "[t]he sequential nature of the method of allocation provided for in s 21 does not 
indicate that non-commercial fishing interests are to be given any substantive priority over 
commercial interests."65 It also follows from this analysis that the majority rejected the possibility 
that s 21 envisages less than the whole TAC being allocated; the majority noted pithily: "It is 
implicit in the scheme of the Act that the total allowable catch is the total that is allowed to be 
caught."66 
C Minority 
Elias CJ would have allowed the appeal, though not for the reasons given by the recreational 
fishers. In her view, s 21(1) exists to ensure the TACC does not exceed the TAC.67 Thus, the 
Minister is required to ascertain the amount of fish removed other than by commercial fishing (be it 
by recreational fishing, customary fishing or poaching), and deduct this from the TAC. What 
remains may be allocated as TACC.68 
However, the TAC does not have to be fully allocated. Section 21(2) ensures that interested 
parties are consulted before the Minister sets the TACC. In Elias CJ's view, this provision "serves a 
different purpose" to s 21(1).69 It is "concerned not with compliance with the total allowable catch ... 
but with the substantive assessment of what the total allowable commercial catch should be, 
applying the policies of the legislation".70 After ascertaining what can be allocated as TACC, the 
Minister must look to the interests provided for in s 21(2) and decide whether the full TACC should 
be allocated. Thus, s 21(2) is a standalone provision "concerned with sustainability ends which are 
not fully addressed by a total allowable catch which maintains the stock at or above maximum 
sustainable yield."71 
  
65  Ibid, at [61]. 
66  Ibid, at [62] (emphasis added). 
67  Ibid, at [4] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
68  Ibid, at [21] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
69  Ibid. 
70  Ibid. 
71  Ibid. 
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The effect of this is that the Minister can set the TACC at a level that leaves some of the TAC 
unallocated in order to provide for other interests, or to move a stock towards sustainability.72 The 
Minister may also set a more conservative TACC because of imperfect information, thus giving 
effect to s 10's precautionary approach.73 This represents a departure from the majority's approach 
which sees the TACC as an allocative decision to which the s 8 principles are not directly relevant.74 
The Chief Justice believed that the TACC is not an allocative decision for five reasons. First, the 
TACC provisions do not contain an explicit parallel "total allowable recreational catch" and, if it is 
implied, s 21 is an odd place for it.75 Second, there is no equivalent to s 20(3) to set the recreational 
allowance at zero, as can be done with commercial catch. The lack of such a provision is not 
consistent with an allocative regime under s 21.76 Third, Elias CJ doubted whether the Minister in 
"allowing for" recreational and Māori interests was required to keep commercial interests in mind. 
Instead, those interests were limited by other parts of the Act, meaning s 21(1) is merely an estimate 
of what is lost, not what should be lost.77 Fourth, if the decision under s 21(1) is merely allocative, it 
seems strange that s 21(2) provides for consultation with environmental interests.78 Fifth, she 
viewed it as a "long step" to turn a requirement "to allow for" recreational interests into "an 
allowance" for recreational fishers, particularly so given the lack of statutory machinery in Part 4 to 
enforce such an allowance.79 
D Analysis 
It will be apparent that the differences between the judgments are founded on differing views of 
what is meant by "allow for" in s 21(1). For the majority, setting the TACC is an allocative decision. 
Sustainability, provided for when setting the TAC, is irrelevant. The task for the Minister is to 
determine what allowances should be made for non-commercial fishing interests and other 
mortality, with the remainder of the TAC going to commercial fishers. For the minority, "allow for" 
has a meaning closer to "recognise". Thus, s 21(1) ensures the TAC is not exceeded when the 
Minister allocates the TACC. After recognising cumulative non-commercial fishing mortality, the 
Minister must determine how much of the remainder of the TAC should be allocated to commercial 
fishers. 
  
72  Ibid, at [22] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
73  Ibid. 
74  Ibid, at [60]. 
75  Ibid, at [24] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
76  Ibid, at [25] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
77  Ibid, at [26] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
78  Ibid, at [27] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
79  Ibid, at [28] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
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1 Majority approach 
The advantage of the majority's approach is its simplicity and transparency. It is consistent with 
sustainability of the stock and movement towards a biomass that can produce MSY.  The Minister 
decides, under s 13, how much is available for utilisation. He or she then considers cultural and 
economic factors associated with moving towards MSY. After the TAC is set, the Minister merely 
needs to make an allocative decision between competing users.  
However, the majority's interpretation does not sit comfortably with the statute's wording. An 
allowance system for non-commercial interests seems incongruous in a section determining 
entitlements under the quota management system (of which recreational interests are not a part). 
More specifically, s 21(1) requires the Minister to "allow for" both non-commercial fishing in s 
21(1)(a) and "[a]ll other mortality caused by fishing" in s 21(1)(b). The phrase "all other mortality" 
in s 21(1)(b) means that s 21(1)(a) is also concerned with mortality. Thus, s 21(1) seeks to ascertain 
the cumulative non-commercial mortality, making it likely the intention is to ensure that non-
commercial mortality, when added to commercial mortality, does not exceed the TAC.80   
The majority's approach also appears to put Māori customary non-commercial fishing interests 
in the same boat as recreational interests. In "allowing for" these interests, the Minister must keep 
commercial interests in mind.81 Similarly, there would be no priority for Māori customary non-
commercial fishing interests as "[t]he sequential nature of the method of allocation provided for in s 
21 does not indicate that non-commercial fishing interests are to be given any substantive priority 
over commercial interests."82 Yet, the majority held that:83 
It is unnecessary in this judgment to discuss the basis on which the allowance for Maori customary non-
commercial fishing interests is to be determined. There is detailed provision in the Act for such interests 
(in Part 9) but no equivalent provision outside of s 21 for recreational interests. 
However, the wording of s 21(4) requires the Minister to take into account any mataitai reserve 
just as s 21(5) requires consideration of regulations restricting the commercial catch under s 311.84 
This makes it appear as though the provision is concerned with ascertaining cumulative fishing 
mortality rather than allocating between competing interests.  
Moreover, the majority's interpretation of s 21(1) leads to absurd conclusions. The "all other 
mortality" referred to in s 21(1)(b) "will principally, if not totally, be that caused by illegal 
  
80  Ibid, at [26]. 
81  Ibid, at [53]. 
82  Ibid, at [61]. 
83  Ibid, at footnote 21. 
84  Ibid, at [28] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
 FISHING FOR THE BIG BOYS: COMPETING INTERESTS UNDER THE FISHERIES ACT 1996 777 
fishing."85 If the words "shall allow for" are to apply consistently across s 21(1), the Minister is 
required to provide poachers with an allowance. Similarly, recreational fishers are unable to catch 
species too far offshore to be readily targeted. The majority recognised this, stating that, in such a 
case, the considered allowance would be nil.86 An "allowance" of nil does not conform to common 
usage, making it less likely that the legislature intended s 21(1) to mandate allocation. The better 
view is that of Elias CJ, namely that s 21(1) provides for an estimate of total loss, not of what should 
be lost.87 
Such a view is supported by the statutory history. Initially the Bill required the Minister to "have 
regard to" the interests expressed in s 21(1).88 The Select Committee agreed that this language was 
too weak, stating:89 
We agree with this point and recommend that the Minister "allow for", non commercial interests. The 
non-commercial allowance will be quantified and enforced through bag limits and other controls or 
customary fishing regulations. 
In changing the language from "have regard to" to "allow for" the Select Committee cited 
submissions which "felt that a clear priority should be given to Maori customary fishing, 
recreational fishing, or both".90 As Elias CJ noted, these statements are consistent with s 21(1) being 
an estimate of total loss, as "have regard to" is too weak to achieve this.91 
The majority viewed s 21(2) as a consultative provision attached to the allocative provision 
under s 21(1).92 Consultation with competing fishing interests is understandable in light of this 
interpretation. However, if the TACC is divorced from considerations of sustainability (those being 
dealt with under the prior setting of the TAC), the requirement to consult environmental interests 
has less apparent justification. The majority's argument was that "[t]he environmental sector is also 
interested and will be concerned that the allocations, on which the integrity of the total allowable 
commercial catch depends, are enforceable."93 The problem with this, as Elias CJ notes, is that if 
  
85  Ibid, at [48]. 
86  Ibid, at footnote 28. 
87  Ibid, at [26] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
88  Ibid, at [31] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
89  Primary Production Committee Report on the Fisheries Bill (New Zealand Parliament Primary Production 
Committee, 1996) at xv. 
90  The Kahawai case, above n 2, at [31] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
91  Ibid. 
92  Ibid, at [57]. 
93  Ibid. 
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environmental interests have an interest in the TACC, they also have an interest in the total 
recreational catch, for which there is no requirement of consultation under s 21(2).94 
2 Minority approach 
The advantage of the minority approach is that it gives effect to the wording of s 21. It means 
that s 21(1) is concerned with cumulative non-commercial fishing mortality. This makes the 
reference to poaching a pragmatic recognition to ensure the TAC is not exceeded. However, the 
minority's approach complicates the Minister's decision. By not fully allocating the TAC, the 
minority's approach requires the Minister to make two policy decisions: first, what the TAC is; and 
then whether it should be fully apportioned. Section 13(3) requires social, cultural and economic 
factors to be considered when setting a TAC that will produce MSY. But, as the majority notes, 
"there is no requirement of that sort expressed in s 21."95 This means the second decision must have 
different considerations not covered by s 13(3), but Elias CJ does not explain what those are. 
It is also arguable that the minority does not give effect to the Act 's purpose. Elias CJ's approach 
requires that the TAC does not mean the total allowed to be caught. The upshot is that this could 
artificially inflate the TAC by having it at a level above that which is utilised.  Seemingly, the 
simpler solution is to reduce the TAC under s 13 rather than to have unallocated TAC. While this is 
a necessary consequence of her approach, Elias CJ does not justify how such a method facilitates the 
policy of the Act. The risk of this approach is that it will be viewed as dislocating competing 
interests; that is, each sector will have an allocation made in isolation, an approach that fails to 
recognise the interconnectedness of the decisions involved. 
3 Differing philosophies   
While the differences between the majority and minority appear fairly technical in nature, they 
mask competing philosophies regarding the purpose of the quota management system. This makes 
the effect of the differences much more significant. The majority views s 13 as wholly providing for 
both sustainability and utilisation. Thus, any TAC set will "enable people to provide for their social, 
economic, and cultural well-being" as required by the s 8(2) definition of utilisation. However, the 
driver of s 13 is the requirement to move towards or above MSY.96  
In contrast, the minority view is that the TAC may not provide for all utilisation or sustainability 
demands. Unallocated TAC is consistent with this: TAC may be held back if the purpose of the Act 
  
94  Ibid, at [27] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
95  Ibid, at [60]. 
96  Ibid, at [43]. 
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would be better fulfilled by doing so. Elias CJ's approach means the Minister has two ways of 
providing for the interests of non-commercial fishers:97 
To the extent that non-commercial fishers are interested in more plentiful fish and larger specimens, 
their interest is served by the total allowable catch being set to maintain a stock above a level that can 
produce the maximum sustainable yield and by the total allowable commercial catch being set at a level 
that does not exhaust the total allowable catch. 
While Elias CJ's judgment stressed the sustainability function of s 13, her decision implicitly 
acknowledges the utilisation component involved when the Minister acts to set a biomass above that 
producing MSY. This acknowledgement is common to both the majority and minority decisions. It 
is based on the wording of s 13(2)(a) which enables the Minister to set a TAC "at or above a level 
that can produce the maximum sustainable yield, having regard to the interdependence of stocks". 
Both the minority and majority view this provision as enabling the Minister to set a TAC above a 
level that can produce MSY. Setting a TAC above the biomass required to produce MSY will 
enhance the quality of the fishery, meaning that fish are larger and easier to catch. Given that 
sustainability is provided for in ascertaining maximum sustainable yield, any further increase in 
biomass must be based on utilisation considerations. The key question left unanswered by Elias CJ's 
approach is why the Minister needs the discretion to apply the purpose of the Act when setting the 
TACC as well as the TAC. 
4 Evaluation 
(a) Operation of the Act 
The minority's approach is more consistent with the way in which it appears the Act was 
intended to operate. The Act requires the Minister first to set a TAC under s 13.98 Given the 
principles in ss 9 and 10, this should be set using the best possible information. This approach was 
recognised as correct in Antons Trawling.99 Once set, the TAC remains in effect until changed. In 
Antons Trawling, while reluctant to accept that there was no duty to review TACs, Miller J 
recognised that "the Minister is not required to review TACs at regular intervals."100 When the 
Minister does decide to review the TAC, Antons Trawling demonstrates that the Act envisages the 
Minister doing so with information.101 
  
97  Ibid, at [18] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
98  Ibid, at [53]. 
99  Antons Trawling Co Ltd v The Minister of Fisheries, above n 1, at [61]. 
100  Ibid, at [60]. 
101  Ibid, at [50]. 
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The TACC, by contrast, is much easier to change. During the operation of the TAC, the Minister 
may be faced with an exigency that requires him or her to increase biomass. This could be the 
product of a natural fluctuation of biomass (perhaps due to disease) or the product of overfishing. In 
either case, the legislation envisages that the Minister can reduce the TACC (as well as reducing 
non-commercial take through regulations) in response. This alternative response to reducing the 
TAC can be taken without the need to use the best possible information. This in effect enables the 
Minister to take a precautionary approach. If on further research it becomes apparent that the TAC is 
set at an unsustainable level, the Minister has a power to alter it under s 13.  
This context indicates how the TACC may be reduced even though the TAC remains constant. 
Rather than viewing this as an artificial inflation of the TAC, it should be seen as a pragmatic 
method by which the Minister can increase biomass. Although the Minister does not necessarily 
have regard to considerations outside s 13, he or she acts within different constraints. This also 
explains the consultation provision in s 21(2). Where the Minister deems it necessary to alter the 
TACC, this will have an impact on biomass that concerns commercial, non-commercial and 
environmental interests. 
On this approach, the law change prompted by Antons Trawling was unnecessary. Instead of 
reducing the TAC with no information, the Minister should have been able to reduce the TACC 
until such time that he had information enabling him to make an informed decision regarding the 
TAC. The advantage of this approach is that it incentivises a higher standard of information. If 
commercial fishers want the TAC or TACC to be increased, they can improve their chances by 
proving the sustainability of the increase. In contrast, s 13(2A) risks creating the opposite incentives, 
a point analysed further below. 
(b) Alternative operation of the Act 
It may also be that s 13 was never intended to have a utilisation component beyond s 13(3). A 
number of factors support this interpretation. First, s 13 appears in Part 3, entitled "Sustainability 
Measures". Second, s 13 requires the Minister to set a TAC that maintains the stock at or above a 
level that can produce MSY, having regard to the interdependence of stocks. Thus, it seems to 
contemplate a biomass above MSY only where the interdependence of stocks makes this a desirable 
outcome. This interpretation is consistent with the ecosystem approach to fisheries management, an 
explicit aim of the Ministry of Fisheries described above. This is also consistent with the wording of 
s 13(3), which requires the Minister to have regard to social, cultural, and economic factors when 
considering how to move the TAC towards a biomass that will produce MSY. If it were 
contemplated that the TAC was to provide for utilisation, it would make sense for the Minister to 
have regard to social, cultural and economic factors when considering how, and whether, to move to 
MSY. That is not what the section says. Instead, a plain reading of the section indicates that 
utilisation may only be relevant to s 13(3) to ensure interests do not go unrecognised when a stock is 
being "fished down" to a biomass that produces MSY. The rest of s 13 is concerned with ensuring 
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that the TAC does not exceed the biomass that can produce MSY, as a sustainability measure. This 
lower biomass limit is an environmental bottom-line within which the Minister must work. 
If this were the intention of s 13, the minority approach would be the only tenable one. Only 
when allocating the TACC could the Minister choose not to allocate all of it in order to provide for 
people's social, economic and cultural well-being. Without such a provision, the Minister would be 
obliged to set the TAC at a level that produced MSY, and then fully allocate it. Under this 
interpretation, if s 13 provided for all utilisation aspirations, it would assume that a fishery 
producing MSY would adequately cater for people's social, economic and cultural well-being. 
However, in reality, this is not the case. Differing interests will have competing aspirations for a 
fishery. An obvious example is the Kahawai case itself, with recreational fishers desiring larger fish 
that are easier to catch – an outcome achieved by a biomass set above that which will produce MSY. 
Interestingly, this approach appears to be supported by changes between the 1983 and 1996 
Acts. Under the 1983 Act, the concept of MSY was part of the definition of TAC in s 2. That section 
provided that the: 
[TAC], with respect to the yield from a fishery, means the amount of fish, aquatic life, or seaweed that 
will produce from that fishery the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by any relevant economic or 
environmental factors, fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks of fish, and any generally 
recommended sub-regional or regional or global standards. 
McGechan J in the High Court said this definition meant "[t]he Minister [was] expected, 
implicitly, to progress the stock to [a biomass that produces MSY], subject to [the] qualifiers".102 
The "qualifiers" referred to are those listed in the definition of TAC. This interpretation was 
confirmed on appeal, where the Court of Appeal referred to the obligation to move to MSY as a 
"prima facie duty".103 However, the duty was subject to the qualifiers, which "were relevant to 
whether, and if so, by what means and over what time the prima facie duty should be 
implemented".104 This means that if the qualifiers were strong enough, the Minister could decide 
that the prima facie duty to move to MSY should not be implemented. 
The 1996 Act moved the "qualifiers" to s 13(3), limiting their application to the Minister's 
determination of the way and rate (but not whether) a stock is moved towards MSY. The Court of 
  
102  New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen (Inc) v Minister of Fisheries HC Wellington CP294/96, 
24 April 1997, at 85. 
103  New Zealand Fishing Industry Association (Inc) v Minister of Fisheries CA82/97, 22 July 1997 at 13 per 
Tipping J. 
104  Ibid (emphasis added). 
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Appeal construed this as strengthening the obligation to move a stock towards MSY. This indicates 
that Parliament never envisioned s 13 as having a utilisation component beyond s 13(3):105 
In short, the Minister now has a clear obligation to move the stock towards MSY and when deciding 
upon the time frame and the ways to achieve that statutory objective the Minister must consider all 
relevant social, cultural and economic factors. 
(c) Giving effect to differing values 
The primary policy advantage of the minority's approach is that it gives effect to different values 
put on fish by users. The majority decision in the Kahawai case that recreational fishers do not have 
primacy means that all interests are considered to be equal.106 This makes allocation of the TAC a 
quantitative (catch history) decision, not a qualitative one. The majority held:107 
Section 8's purpose does not, however, extend to a requirement that the Minister proceed on the basis of 
a comparative analysis of well-being factors in relation to recreational interests and other interests 
affected by the setting of the total allowable commercial catch. 
This means the Minister cannot have regard to the different values put on fish when allocating 
the TAC. This ignores the fact that different interests may have different values within utilisation. 
For example, a Kahawai caught and eaten by a recreational fisher may be of higher value to one 
caught and sold as pet food by a commercial fisher. A South Australian study indicated that 
recreational fishers valued the species they caught at 11 to 16 times the value estimated for the same 
species caught by commercial fishers.108 
In this context, it is understandable that the recreational fishers argued that they should have 
some form of priority under the Act.109 While rejecting this argument, the majority still saw the 
setting of the TACC as an area in which the Minister has room to make policy choices.110 Section 
20(3) enables the Minister to set or vary the TACC at or to zero. Yet, as qualitative factors are 
excluded from the Minister's decision, it could easily be viewed as unreasonable to have a 
significant disparity between commercial and recreational take. This subsequently constrains the 
Minister's ability to make a decision substantially benefiting one group at the expense of the other. 
  
105  Ibid, at 14. 
106  The Kahawai case, above n 2, at [61]. 
107  Ibid, at [60]. 
108  Voxy "Social, Cultural Well-being Eyed for Setting of Kahawai Quotas" (12 February 2009) 
<www.voxy.co.nz>. 
109  The Kahawai case, above n 2, at [3] per Elias CJ dissenting.  
110  Ibid, at [61]. 
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The minority's approach avoids this difficulty by viewing s 21(1) as ascertaining cumulative 
non-commercial fishing mortality. This means the allocations to non-commercial fishing interests 
are decided elsewhere, an approach which enables the Minister to give effect to qualitative 
aspirations of those interests. It also clearly allows primacy to be given to Māori customary 
interests, without which many iwi would not have supported the fisheries settlement.111 The 
minority approach also allows the Minister to reduce the TACC as a way of increasing biomass to 
provide for aspirations of bigger fish that are easier to catch. 
The risk of dislocation between competing interests by using the minority's approach would be 
easy to overstate. It is obvious that the Minister would know that he or she is allocating a scarce 
resource when providing for various interests. The consultation required by s 21(2) enables 
competing interests to voice their aspirations. For example, commercial fishers who believe a TACC 
is too small (thus reducing the value of their quota property rights) can complain to the Minister that 
bag limits are set too high. While catch rates are likely to increase if the Minister does not fully 
allocate the TAC, this can be controlled through modifying recreational fishers' allowances in Part 
16. The fact that s 21(2) requires consultation with various interests seems to recognise both the 
qualitative and quantitative interconnectedness of the decisions involved. Similar requirements for 
consultation exist where the Minister seeks to close specific areas to commercial fishing.112 
V THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGES 
While the decision of the minority may be preferable, it currently does not represent the law in 
New Zealand. It is important to analyse the deeper effects of the majority's decision. This part 
focuses on the impact of the majority's decision on two levels. First, it analyses the implications for 
those operating under the Act: recreational fishers and commercial fishers, and those with Māori 
customary interests or environmental interest. Second, it contextualises the effects of the majority's 
decision in light of fisheries management policy and the future of fisheries management. 
A Effect on Interested Parties Under the Act 
1 Effect on the environment 
The effect of the Kahawai case is that had s 13(2A) not been passed, it would now be required. 
The Minister must have a way to limit catches where it appears that, despite a lack of evidence, the 
TAC is unsustainable. During Parliamentary debates, the Labour Party recognised that this was 
necessary if the Act was to give effect to the precautionary principle.113 On a preferable 
interpretation of the Act this could be achieved by reducing the TACC. However, the new provision 
  
111  Lock and Leslie, above n 8, at 43. 
112  Fisheries Act 1996, s 311. 
113  Hon Damien O'Connor MP (Labour) (23 September 2008) 650 NZPD 19017. 
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cuts both ways. It means that without any evidence as to sustainability, the Minister can increase the 
TAC. The wording in s 10 means that the Minister merely has to "take into account" this lack of 
information before setting the TAC under s 13(2A) at whatever level he or she believes will enable 
the fishery to move to MSY. This has obvious implications for both the efficacy of s 10 and the 
precautionary principle. 
Section 13(2A) also creates undesirable incentives for research. Research functions are 
increasingly devolved to the industry.114 Section 13(2A) means that commercial fishers do not have 
to demonstrate the sustainability of their fishing, thus creating an incentive to do the least research 
possible. Whereas before the Minister could reduce the TACC (thus increasing biomass) until he or 
she was satisfied the TAC was sustainable, that is no longer a possibility. It is absurd to require the 
Minister to set a TAC at or above a level that can produce MSY without any information. Yet this is 
the case for 50 per cent of stocks,115 while only two to five per cent of stocks by number (though a 
bigger volume by value) are set on a literal interpretation of a biomass that will produce MSY.116 
This issue is ever more urgent when set against the backdrop of a 30 per cent cut to the Ministry's 
science programmes.117 
The reduction in informational requirements may also lead to an increase in ascertaining stocks 
simply by reference to effort expended. The basic principle underlying this approach is that if effort 
remains constant, a declining fishery will produce reduced yields. The problem with this approach is 
that it is not always representative. This was recognised by the Ministry in a briefing note to the 
Primary Production Select Committee. The note states:118 
Because fishing is generally targeted at dense aggregations of fish, the normal indicators of stock 
depletion, such as gradually declining catch rates, are not reliable in these fisheries. Often, catch rates 
continue at high levels even though the stock biomass is being depleted. 
A possible solution was put forward by the Green Party.119 It proposed that, if the Minister 
wanted to rely on s 13(2A), he or she could maintain or reduce the TAC, but not increase it. In order 
to increase the TAC it would need to be demonstrated that the proposed increase moves the stock 
towards MSY. The advantage of this approach is similar to that of the previous one; if fishers want 
the TAC increased they have an incentive to do research to show that the increase is sustainable. 
  
114  Lock and Leslie, above n 8, at 52. 
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The Green party also pushed for inclusion of a provision to ensure the principles of the Act are 
taken into account when setting a TAC under s 13(2).120 
This issue exists in the context of two broader problems. The first is that biomass is held out to 
be a sufficient indicator of ecosystem health when in reality, it is not. Overfishing and 
environmental degradation are far more closely linked to a failure to control when, where and how 
fishing occurs.121 The current system does divide stocks up into quota management areas, but still 
incentivises getting the most fish for the smallest amount of effort. This creates a localised race to 
fish that undermines the aspiration of the Act to take an ecosystem approach to fishing. Removing 
top predators from an area fundamentally alters the ecosystem. An example is kina barrens, where, 
in the absence of predators such as snapper and crayfish, kina devour kelp forests, reducing the 
diversity and productivity of the area.122 Thus, while the biomass of an overall quota management 
area may still be at a level that can produce MSY, specific habitats may be affected significantly. 
The second problem involves a breakdown in fisheries management theory. The theory is that, 
as fishers have a property right in their individual transferable quota, it is in their interest to act in a 
manner that preserves the integrity of that property. This should operate on two levels: fishers 
should fish sustainably, and do so in a way that protects that habitat from whence their property 
comes. No doubt many fishers do. Yet these incentives only operate at a collective level. At an 
individual level, incentives favour acting in one's own interest to reap individual benefits, whilst 
sharing associated negative externalities across the group. This is known as the tragedy of the 
commons. While dealing with the tragedy of the commons is beyond the scope of this article, its 
effects are exacerbated by the reduction of informational requirements and modification of 
incentives to do research. 
2 Effect on commercial fishers 
Commercial fishers benefit the most from the majority's decision. It provides them with 
considerable certainty, an important aspect given the property right conferred by an individual 
transferable quota. It means their interests are viewed as equal to that of non-commercial fishers. 
The majority's decision also makes it likely that commercial fishers will continue to push for 
increases in the TAC. Because a TAC must be fully allocated, commercial fishers know that 
increases are likely to be allocated to them.  
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121  Alison Reiser "Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in US Fisheries: Contracting out for the 
Commons?" (1997) 24 Ecology LQ 813 at 815-816.  
122  This effect is known as a trophic cascade. See Vince Kerr and Roger Grace Intertidal and Subtidal Habitats 
of Mimiwhangata Marine Park and Adjacent Shelf (DOC Research & Development Series 201, Department 
of Conservation, 2005) at 31-32; NT Shears and RC Babcock "Continuing trophic cascade effects after 25 
years of no-take marine reserve protection" (2003) 1 Marine Ecology Progress Series 246 at [1.16]. 
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3 Effect on recreational fishers 
The effect on recreational fishers is that their interests are deemed to be on the same level as 
commercial interests, even where they place a greater value in a stock. As a consequence, if the 
Minister wishes to prioritise recreational interests on qualitative grounds, he or she will have to take 
more drastic action. Section 311 allows the Minister to recommend regulations to close areas to 
commercial fishing to protect access for recreational fishers.123 As pressure on fish stocks continues 
to increase, it seems likely that there will also be increasing pressure on the Minister to invoke s 
311. 
The majority's decision also means that recreational interests only have an opportunity to alter 
the biomass of a stock when the TAC is reviewed. This may happen less often than the setting of the 
TACC. While the Minister could allocate more to recreational interests when he or she sets the 
TACC, the Minister cannot allocate more than the recreational fishers are able to catch.124 To do so 
would mean that some of the TAC would be unallocated, artificially inflating biomass and thus 
failing to give effect to s 13 as a utilisation provision.  
4 Effect on Māori fishing interests 
The effect on Māori customary non-commercial fishing interests largely depends on whether 
those interests retain priority. As was indicated, statutory interpretation indicates they are on the 
same level as recreational interests. However, the majority's footnote stating that "[i]t is unnecessary 
in this judgment to discuss the basis on which the allowance for Maori customary non-commercial 
fishing interests is to be determined" may preserve Māori customary priority.125 This ought to be the 
outcome. As a matter of policy, the allowance to Māori customary non-commercial fishing interests 
should fully satisfy those interests, despite the inconsistencies in the majority's reasoning.126 
B Fisheries Management Policy and the Future 
The recently released Fisheries 2030 represents the strategic direction of the Ministry.127 At a 
high level, that direction is still one that maximises benefits from the use of fisheries within 
environmental limits.128 However, a number of principles that Fisheries 2030 aspires to are at odds 
with the change to s 13 and the Kahawai case. 
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127  Ministry of Fisheries Fisheries 2030 (2009) at 5. 
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The addition of s 13(2A) and its associated problems undermine the principles which aspire to 
an ecosystem based approach and a precautionary approach.129 These principles suggest that the 
Greens' amendment is significantly closer to the 2030 aspiration than the status quo is. The localised 
race to fish risks compromising the principle of conserving diversity.130 The effect of the majority's 
decision in the Kahawai case appears to be a direct challenge to the Ministry's principle of "dynamic 
efficiency".131 This principle extrapolates that "[f]rameworks should be established to allow 
resources to be allocated to those who value them most".132 This indicates that a qualitative 
approach with a biomass set above that producing MSY is to be preferred in the future.  
More broadly, where a fishery is targeted at producing MSY, recreational and environmental 
interests are disadvantaged significantly. It is self evident that if the biomass of kahawai is 17 per 
cent, and thus the fishery is producing MSY,133 recreational fishers have a far smaller chance of 
catching a fish than if the biomass is higher. Similarly, the impact of the environmental concerns 
outlined above is aggravated by a lower biomass. Yet an affidavit from a fisheries scientist in the 
Kahawai case indicated that 90 per cent of MSY can be achieved with a biomass anywhere between 
16 and 40 per cent.134 This indicates that with good information, the Minister can set the TAC at a 
level that comes very close to attaining MSY, while better reflecting recreational and environmental 
interests, than by setting the TAC at a level that produces MSY. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The Fisheries Act balances a number of competing and important rights. In 2007, the total value 
of seafood exports was $1.3 billion.135 The industry provides direct employment to over 7000 full-
time equivalent people, and indirectly employs another 15,000.136 At the same time, recreational 
fishing is considered to be part of the fabric of New Zealand society, with many New Zealanders 
considering it to be their birthright.137 In addition to cultural value, recreational fishing also has 
considerable economic value. The direct and indirect economic effects associated with recreational 
fishing are thought to be nearly $1 billion for the five major recreational species alone.138 In 
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addition to fishing, the marine environment is increasingly used for mining, tourism and 
aquaculture.  
Increasing sustainability pressures bring with them the need for a more comprehensive response 
to ecosystem management. The reduction of informational requirements under s 13(2A) represents a 
backwards step in this regard. The Kahawai case demonstrates the need for ministerial discretion to 
give effect to values held by different interests. Unfortunately, that case represents an unnecessary 
reduction of discretion, largely in favour of commercial interests. For fisheries management to 
achieve the aspirations of Fisheries 2030, more needs to be done to enable the Minister to make 
what are essentially political decisions regarding the sustainable use of New Zealand's marine 
environment.   
 
